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INTRODUCTION 
It has become commonplace to recognize that the use of tariffs to 
restrict international trade has been gradually replaced in recent years by 
the use of other tools of coinnercial policy. These nontariff barriers 
(NTBs) include such heterogeneous policy tools as import quotas, voluntary 
export restraints (VERs), exchange controls, domestic content requirements, 
and many more. ' It is reasonable to ask why these various alternatives to 
tariffs have come to be preferred, and it is the purpose of this paper to 
address this question. Since many of the more cormK)n NTBs, like quotas, 
deal directly with the quantities of goods traded rather than their prices 
while tariffs influence trade through prices alone, a related question is 
why nonprice measures of restricting trade have come to replace price 
measures. This is an important question for us here, since economists 
generally show a preference for the latter. Indeed, trade theorists are 
nearly unanimous in preferring tariffs to other forms of trade 
intervention, and it seems perverse of the world's governments that they 
have reduced tariffs at our urging, only to replace them with barriers we 
regard as more onerous. 
There can be no single answer to the question of why governments 
prefer NTBs. It is undoubtedly true that a variety of reasons contribute 
*I have benefited greatly from discussions with Robert M. Stern in preparing this 
paper. Many useful comments were also provided on an earlier draft of the paper by my 
students in an international economic policy class and by participants in the graduate 
international trade seminar at Michigan, in the Carnegie-Rochester Conference, and in a 
conference on trade theory at the University of Western Ontario. I am especially grateful for 
ccxnments from Karl Brunner and Michael Mussa. The research underlying this paper was 
supported in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation. 
‘See Nogues et al. (1985) for a mOre complete discussion of the variety of NTBs that have 
been used in recent years. 
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to any particular use of trade policy and that different instances of trade 
intervention have been motivated differently. Thus I will not attempt to 
make a case for any single explanation or theory of the policy process. 
Instead I will take an eclectic approach, discussing a variety of answers 
that can be found in the literature as well as a number of additional 
suggestions that have come to mind independently. 
This will not be a very technical discussion. There are too many 
ideas to be covered in a small space to permit any one of them the luxury 
of being expounded by means of an elaborate analytical apparatus. Nor 
would that really be necessary, for most of the ideas are quite 
straightforward, while the others have been analyzed rigorously elsewhere. 
I will divide the discussion into two parts. I will begin by looking 
at a list of miscellaneous reasons for the preference for NTBs that I have 
gleaned from the literature. These include: institutional constraints such 
as are built into the GATT and the United States constitution; interactions 
among various forms of trade policy and market structure; ways that one 
country may react to, or retaliate against, the trade policies of another 
country; differences among policies in the extent to which they engender 
rent-seeking behavior: and differences among policies in the ways that they 
perform in an uncertain world. 
These reasons are interesting in themselves, and I am sure that some 
of them are correct in telling part of the story of why NTBs are coming to 
dominate trade policy. But I am also sure that they do not tell the whole 
story. In many cases I think that these reasons are more subtle and/or 
more elaborate than they need to be, and I will express my reservations as 
I go along. 
In the second main part of the paper I will therefore focus my 
attention on a much narrower class of explanations for the preference for 
NTBs: the perception that tariffs simply will not work. It is my belief 
that much of the preference for NTBs stems from the perception on the part 
of the affected parties, both in government and in the public, that using a 
tariff to reduce imports will not in fact do the job. Somehow it is 
believed, rationally or otherwise, that the flood of imports that seems to 
be causing domestic injury will continue unabated in spite of any 
reasonably sized tariff, and that only an explicit quantitative restriction 
can have the desired effect. I will therefore discuss a variety of reasons 
behind such a perception and suggest that it may not be as unwarranted as 
it sounds. 
Before proceeding I should say a few words about why I believe 
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governments restrict trade at all. In spite of their opposition in 
principle to the use of any policy to restrict trade, trade theorists have 
been quite creative in generating rationales for doing so. These range 
from the use of tariffs to improve the terms of trade, through a host of 
second-best policies for dealing with domestic distortions, to the recently 
developed ideas for using trade policy to divert monopoly profits toward 
domestic residents or government. Many of these ideas, while valid in 
theory, I view as too arcane to be the real reasons for most instances of 
trade intervention. In addition, to the extent that these reasons are 
based on maximizing a general notion of social welfare, they need to invoke 
a "public interest" theory of government that is of questionable relevance. 
Instead, I believe that most trade intervention is used for the avowed 
purpose of protecting the livelihoods of workers and firms in troubled 
industries where import competition is seen as at least part of the 
trouble. Trade intervention could in principle be used to raise the wages 
of groups of workers, the profits of groups of firms, or, through the terms 
of trade, the welfare of all consumers together. In fact, though, I see 
most instances of trade intervention as much more defensive in nature. 
Trade barriers are erected to prevent losses in wages and profits, and, 
even more so, to prevent bankruptcies and unemployment. One can argue, 
correctly, that even when these objectives are valid, trade policy is at 
most a second-best means of achieving them. It does no good merely to 
dismiss them, however, and proceed as if the real motives for protection 
lie elsewhere. 
Therefore, as will become clear, I have little patience with 
explanations of the preference for NTBs that are based on policymakers' 
objectives that I believe are farfetched. We are trying, after all, to 
explain what policymakers themselves do, and not what we, with our 
sophisticated economic models and limited exposure to the real world, would 
do in their place. 
I m ASSORTED REASONS FROM THE LITERATURE 
In this section I will discuss a variety of reasons why NTBs might be 
preferred to tariffs, the only really conmron thread among which is that 
they do not belong in the section which follows. That is, these reasons 
are not based on doubts about the ability of tariffs to reduce trade. All 
of them are based to some degree on contributions that can be found in the 
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literature, though these contributions have not always been viewed by their 
authors as providing rationales for NTBs. 
Much of this literature has been identified with the issue of the 
equivalence, or nonequivalence, of tariffs and quotas. The seminal 
contribution on this subject was Bhagwati (1965), who noted that with 
perfectly competitive markets everywhere, tariffs and quotas are 
equivalent, but with imperfect competition that equivalence fails. That 
is, with perfect competition, exactly the same results that can be achieved 
with a quota can also be achieved with a tariff of an appropriate size, and 
vice versa, so long as the revenue from the tariff and the rent from the 
quota accrue to, and are spent by, the same individuals. With imperfectly 
competitive markets, on the other hand, the differences that a tariff and a 
quota imply for the elasticity of demand facing the domestic industry cause 
this equivalence to break down. In this case, a tariff and a quota that 
have the same effects on the quantity of imports, for example, will have 
different effects on the domestic price and/or on the level of production 
in the domestic market. 
This result of Bhagwati's has stimulated others to search for 
alternative scenarios in which tariffs and quotas will fail to be 
equivalent. This literature is briefly surveyed in Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1983) and Corden (1984), and some of it will be touched on below, for if 
tariffs and quotas are really equivalent, then there can be no reason to 
prefer one or the other. Reasons for nonequivalence therefore carry with 
them reasons why one or the other policy might be preferred, and therefore, 
potentially, reasons why governments might show bias in their selection of 
policies. 
A. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
A first reason to consider has little to do with economics but may 
nonetheless be the proximate cause of the preference for NTBs in many 
instances: Institutions have been erected that constrain the use of 
tariffs, and thus lead policymakers to search for other means--nontariff 
measures by default--of achieving their objectives. The most far-reaching 
of these institutions is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
in which signatories comnit themselves to rigid rules in the use of 
tariffs, including that any change in tariffs be done on a most-favored 
nation (MFN) basis. But other such institutions also exist within the 
sovereign countries of the trading world, such as the separation of powers 
within the United States government that relegates to Congress the power to 
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levy tariffs and leaves the administrative branch to search for other 
means, again nontariff means, of manipulating trade. 
It would be easy to acknowledge institutional arrangements such as 
these as the sole reason for the preference for NTBs, and thus pass the 
task of explanation on to the legal or political scholars whose job it is 
to examine such institutions. That would be unsatisfactory on two 
accounts. First, to do so would leave unanswered the question of why these 
institutions were configured as they were, and therefore leaves open the 
possibility that the institutions are themselves a reflection of the 
preference for using NTBs. And second, it would accept too uncritically 
that the institutions prevent the use of tariffs. 
On the first of these points, one must ask why it is that the framers 
of the GATT chose to constrain the use of tariffs more severely than the 
use of NTBs. Might it not be the case that the member countries were 
willing to submit to the discipline of the GATT regarding tariffs precisely 
because tariffs were not the policies that they wished to use in any 
case? In fact, the articles of the GATT do constrain the use of quotas, 
though less firmly and with more ambiguous language than is used to bind 
tariffs. Nonetheless, while countries have generally been willing to 
submit to the constraints on tariffs, they have been much less willing to 
do so for quotas. Quantitative restrictions have been used frequently, by 
many countries and in many industries, ever since the GATT was formed. 
Since both quotas and non-MFN tariff increases violate the principles of 
the GATT, one must ask why countries chose to break one rule and not the 
other. The answer must be a preference for quotas that has nothing to do 
with the GATT and which therefore still needs to be explained. 
The second point is that these international and domestic legal 
institutions do not constrain the use of tariffs nearly as much as it may 
seem at first glance. Within both the GATT and United States law, there 
are several specific provisions for using duties to deal with the 
disruptive effects of trade and trade policies. The escape clause of 
United States trade law, for example, permits the use of a duty when it can 
be established that imports are a substantial cause of injury. Similar 
provisions permit responses to what are perceived as unfair trade practices 
of other countries, such as dumping and the use of government subsidies. 
It may be argued that these provisions are too cumbersome to be used 
in a timely fashion, and there is some truth to that. On the other hand, 
these provisions have been used, and furthermore, in a surprising number of 
cases, though the institutions would have permitted the use of a tariff to 
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protect domestic industry, deliberate use has been made instead of an 
NTB. For example, of the 55 escape-clause cases filed under Section 201 of 
the U.S. 1974 trade act between 1974 and 1984, 28 were decided in the 
affirmative by the ITC. All of these could have led to a duty being 
imposed on imports, but in fact in only ten of the cases was any action 
taken and in seven of these the action included some form of nontariff 
measure such as a quota, an orderly marketing arrangement, or a voluntary 
export restraint. 2 Thus it appears that the institutions do permit the use 
of tariffs on some occasions and that governments nonetheless often resort 
to NTBs out of choice, not out of necessity. 
B. IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
I have already alluded to Bhagwati's (1965) original case of the 
nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas, which focused on imperfect 
competition. His example naturally raises the question of whether, when 
markets are imperfect, the difference between tariffs and quotas will cause 
governments to prefer one or the other. 
Bhagwati's simplest example will suffice to motivate the discussion. 
He considered a domestic industry in which there is a single domestic firm, 
but in which a large number of foreign firms cause the market to be 
competitive as long as there is free trade. In this situation a tariff, 
which merely raises the domestic price above the world price by a fixed 
amount, helps the domestic firm but leaves it facing a fixed, albeit 
higher, price. Thus it continues to behave as a perfect competitor. A 
quota, on the other hand, allows the domestic firm to raise price 
arbitrarily far above the world price, sacrificing in sales only the loss 
of domestic demand as it moves up the domestic demand curve. Thus the 
quota provides the firm a protected market in which it can act as a 
monopolist. This in turn leads to the other asymmetries in behavior that 
indicate the nonequivalence of the two policies, such as that a quota which 
restricts imports by the same amount as a tariff will raise the domestic 
price by more than the tariff. 
What does this story imply about the relative desirability of tariffs 
and quotas from a government's point of view? From the standpoint of 
social welfare, it is clear that a government should prefer tariffs, since 
2See Jackson (1985). 
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for a given amount of protection, these avoid the additional distortion due 
to monopoly. But if governments respond not to the social good, but to the 
pressures that are brought to bear upon them by lobbies and interest 
groups, then this model would seem to provide a rationale for quotas. The 
firm described above, for example, would be expected to devote some 
resources to persuading its government to protect it via a quota rather 
than a tariff, since it has so much more to gain from the former. 
Surprisingly, while the first of these arguments is correct, the 
second is not. In a recent paper, Cassing and Hillman (1985) show that 
such a model actually gives rise to a preference for tariffs, not quotas, 
as long as government revenue is not one of the aims being pursued. The 
reason is that a politically responsive government must trade off the 
interests of consumers against those of the protected firm; and while for a 
given level of imports a quota yields greater profits for the firm, it also 
causes greater harm to consumers through a higher price. A proper 
comparison is of two policies that yield not the same level of imports but 
the same level of price. In that case, as had been implicit in the 
analysis of McCulloch (1973), it turns out that the tariff generates the 
larger profit and thus in Cassing and Hillman's model will acquire the 
greater political support. Therefore this model in its simplest form does 
not explain the preference for NTBs. 
Cassing and Hillman do present a case in which quotas could be 
preferred. This arises when, in addition to political support, the 
government is concerned about the revenue that it raises with its trade 
policy. If a quota is auctioned off and the proceeds are kept by the 
government, then it turns out that this additional consideration can turn 
the balance in favor of the quota. Thus we do find a case for using quotas 
in this model, but it requires that quotas be administered in a way that 
they seldom are. 
The model just described is one of monopoly, and of course there are 
many other forms of imperfect competition that could be considered. 
Construction of trade models with various noncompetitive market structures 
has become a minor growth industry in recent years, and these models 
provide fertile ground for exploring the effects of various trade 
policies. I will consider only one such model here, since it bears 
directly on the issue at hand. 
Krishna (1985) has examined the role of quantitative restrictions in a 
duopoly model in which two firms from different countries compete on 
price. It turns out that a quota on one firm's exports into the other's 
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market can raise the profits of both firms. The reason for this outcome is 
that the trade restriction acts as a "facilitating practice" which, by 
limiting the aggressiveness of one of the firms, enables both to raise 
prices above what they otherwise would. As in Brander and Spencer's (1985) 
similar model of a tariff in a two-country Cournot duopoly, the quota in 
Krishna's model commits one of the firms to a course of action that is 
beneficial to both, but would not be credible as a strategy of the firm 
acting in its own interest alone. 
This example once again seems to suggest a case for a quota, since 
firms in the situation of the model have more to gain from a quota than 
from a tariff. However, once again the gain depends on raising the 
domestic price to consumers, and as in the Cassing and Hillman analysis, 
the correct comparison would be to a tariff that raises domestic prices by 
the same amount. In this case a tariff has the effect of raising the 
domestic price of the foreign good by more, and that of the domestic good 
by less, than does a quota, and we must consider two policies that have the 
same effects on consumers' welfare. It turns out once again that a tariff 
which has the same effect on consumers will have a greater positive effect 
on profits of the domestic firm. 3 Thus like the simpler model of Cassing 
and Hillman, the Krishna model predicts a preference for tariffs. 4 
My conclusion from the work that has been done so far on models of 
trade with imperfect competition is that they do not seem to yield a 
compelling explanation for why governments prefer NTBs. It will be 
interesting to see, as this literature evolves in the future, whether this 
conclusion will need to be revised. 
3For those familiar with Krishna’s model, this can be seen as follows. Letting the 
horizontal axis in her diagram represent the price of the foreign firm inclusive of the 
tariff, the isoprof it contours and the reaction curve of the domestic firm are unchanged. A 
tariff, however, shifts the foreign firm’s reaction curve to the right (to higher prices), and 
moves the Nash equilibrium up and to the right along the domestic fir-m’s reaction curve. lhus 
in Krishna’s Diagram 3, a tariff can achieve an equilibrium at the same foreign-firm price as 
the quota, and at the lower of the two prices charged randomly by the domestic firm, and this 
yields the same profit to the domestic firm as does the quota. Since this is preferable for 
consumers to the quota, a larger tariff would be needed to make consumers indifferent, and 
this would lead to a larger profit. 
4The outcomes of the two policies have an additional difference in that the quota leads 
to equilibrium only in a mixed strategy for the domestic firm, which charges a random price 
the expected value of which I have assumed to be equa I to the price due to the tariff . This 
uncertainty of price may be an additional factor in favor of one policy or the other, but I 
will leave that issue to further discussion below. 
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C. RETALIATION 
In one of the better-known sequels to Bhagwati's example of 
nonequivalence, Rodriguez (1974) showed that, even with perfect 
competition, tariffs and quotas will not be equivalent if governments 
attempt to use them reactively to influence the terms of trade at each 
other's expense. Such a process was described for tariffs by Johnson 
(1954). Rodriguez showed that a similar process is possible using quotas, 
but the outcome is not the same. Unfortunately for our purpose, the 
difference between the two cases is that, while the game with tariffs can 
attain a Nash equilibrium with positive trade, the game with quotas cannot: 
and the welfare levels of both countries are necessarily lower in the 
(asymptotically autarkic) quota equilibrium than in any positive-trade 
tariff equilibrium.5 Therefore this particular asyrmnetry between the two 
policies does not suggest any reason why governments might prefer quotas. 
This issue of retaliation by itself, however, does suggest such a 
reason for one particular form of NTB. It is often suggested that the use 
of voluntary export restraints (VERs), which are quantitative restrictions 
implemented by the exporting country but at the behest of the importing 
country, are chosen over both tariffs and import quotas because they are 
less likely to lead to retaliation. This in turn follows from the fact 
that the quota rents generated by a VER are presumed to remain in the 
exporting country, either being collected by its government in return for 
export licenses, or being earned by the exporting firms themselves. 
This seems to be a valid argument for the use of VERs, as long as the 
reason for the trade restriction in the first place does not require the 
restricting country to collect the revenues or rents. For example, one 
could hardly use a VER as a tool to improve the terms of trade, since it is 
the exporting country whose terms of trade must improve with a VER. 
However, to the extent that countries seek protection for other reasons, 
such as the defensive avoidance of market disruption that will be discussed 
further in the next section, then the fact that a VER may actually benefit 
the exporting country by improving its terms of trade and thus deter 
retaliation is surely a plus. 
On the other hand, while this is a valid justification for this 
5As noted in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983). the quota game does not actually hsve an 
equilibrium, but the dynamic process of each country setting its quota based on the oKer's 
quota does lead asymptotically toward autarky. 
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particular form of NTB, it says nothing about another related issue that 
concerns this paper: why do governments use nonprice measures for dealing 
with international trade? For once the exporting country has been induced 
to restrict exports, one could ask why it does not do so via an export tax, 
rather than using a quantitative restriction as is more normally done. The 
benefits to the exporting country and thus the disincentive to retaliate 
would be the same in either case. Once again it seems that there is an 
additional preference for quantitative controls rather than price 
incentives, and this preference does not have anything to do with 
retaliation. There is still something to be explained. 
D. RENT SEEKING 
Yet another difference between tariffs and quotas was pointed out 
forcefully and memorably by Krueger (1974). She observed that since rights 
to import under a quota are not normally auctioned off, but are simply 
granted outright to individuals and firms that are somehow viewed as 
deserving, a quota creates a tremendous incentive for competition among the 
potential recipients of these rights. Such competition uses real resources 
in an amount that may approach the value of the rents from the quota 
themselves, and this loss constitutes an additional cost to society that is 
imposed by a quota but not by a tariff. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) 
have extended the argument to tariffs, noting that agents can compete for 
the benefits that can be financed by the tariff revenues, just as they can 
compete for quota rents. But I suspect that most of us still view the 
rent-seeking phenomenon as the more important one, and therefore accept it 
as an additional cost associated with quotas that deserves to be 
considered. 
What does rent-seeking say about the choice between tariffs and 
quotas? Clearly from a social point of view, rent-seeking makes quotas 
distinctly inferior to tariffs, since the additional resource costs 
involved are potentially much larger than the dead-weight losses that we 
customarily measure for both tariffs and quotas. 
As mentioned before, governments do not always pursue a social 
optimum. Along with rent-seeking in some countries goes an attractive 
opportunity for corruption, if government officials can position themselves 
as the beneficiaries of the rent-seeking behavior. That is, the discretion 
to allocate import licenses gives government officials a degree of power 
than can be far more lucrative, for themselves or their friends and 
relatives, than the levying of tariffs could ever be. In societies where 
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such corruption is commonplace, it therefore seems natural that one would 
find a preference for quotas over tariffs. 
Thus rent-seeking provides both a "good" reason for using tariffs, and 
a "bad," but nonetheless valid, reason for using quotas. I hope that I am 
not being naive to think, however, that this explanation of the preference 
for quotas is not relevant in the major industrialized countries, where 
checks against corruption are well-established and effective. Thus there 
is still something to explain. 
E. UNCERTAINTY 
Finally, I turn to the consideration of uncertainty in the context of 
trade, a feature that has been absent from most models of international 
trade over the years but at the same time has been the subject of a more 
specialized literature of its own. This literature has been surveyed by 
Pomery (1984) and includes within it a number of papers that deal 
explicitly with the .choice of optimal trade policy tools. Thus it is here 
that the most formal and sophisticated analysis of the issue has been 
undertaken. Two of the more recent examples from this literature, in which 
quotas may emerge as superior to tariffs, should suffice to give the flavor 
of the results. 
Young and Anderson (1982) added risk aversion to a model in which they 
had previously (Young and Anderson (1980)) shown tariffs to be optimal. In 
their general equilibrium model an economy faces a random world price, and 
seeks to maximize consumer welfare subject to a ceiling on expected 
imports. Because of risk aversion, the optimal policy attempts to 
stabilize real income, and thus requires that import prices rise and 
imports fall when their world price happens to be low. Neither a tariff 
nor a quota achieves this outcome, but since a quota at least holds both 
constant, it is closer to the optimum and is preferred to a tariff. 
A second recent example is a model of Falvey and Lloyd (1985). 
Their's is a partial equilibrium model that is distinctive in that they 
divide population into both a producer group and a consumer group, 
depending on ownership of factors in the industry being studied. They are 
then able to derive properties of the optimal policies from the standpoint 
of each group, defined as functions relating domestic price to the state of 
the world. Not surprisingly, producer interests are promoted by a policy 
that is similar to a quota, again, it would seem, because of risk aversion. 
Thus it is ultimately risk aversion that leads to a preference for 
quotas in these models. Whenever uncertainty originates outside a country, 
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through randomness in the world price or the import supply curve, then a 
quota can stabilize both the price and the quantity of imports, effectively 
insulating the country from the uncertainty. This then seems to provide a 
clear case in which theoretical considerations favor a quota over a tariff, 
and stands as a good candidate for explaining the behavior we observe. 
Even though these arguments are valid in theory, however, I am 
doubtful that they come very close to capturing what really motivates 
governments in their choice of trade policy. The models of uncertainty, to 
the best of my knowledge, have the common property that the trade policy 
that is chosen must be put in place before the uncertain state of the world 
is known. Thus a quota protects the economy or the industry from a 
possible good outcome at the same time that it protects it from a bad one, 
a form of protection that is typically optimal for risk-averse individuals. 
As I see trade policies being used in the world, though, they are not 
put in place in advance of the changes in world markets from which 
protection is sought. On the contrary, protection is typically a reaction 
to such changes and would not have been sought at all if events had taken a 
turn for the better instead of a turn for the worse. This is not to say 
that no uncertainties remain after trade barriers are erected. But if 
future random events all move in the direction of improvement, I would 
expect to see pressures build to remove the barriers. 
In other words, I see most protection not as an anticipation of 
trouble but as a reaction to troubles that have already begun. Models of 
trade with uncertainty, while theoretically very elegant, miss the point of 
what I think most trade policymakers are trying to accomplish. 
II. THE PERCEPTION THAT TARIFFS WILL NOT WORK 
As must by now be clear, I am unsatisfied with the reasons for 
preferring NTBs that I find stated or implied in the literature. No doubt 
each of the reasons discussed above has some validity, but for the most 
part I believe that they are off the mark. In my view NTBs are most often 
preferred by policymakers because they and their constituents believe that 
tariffs simply will not work--that somehow a tariff, because it does not 
explicitly constrain imports, will be circumvented by foreign exporters and 
be ineffective. Before I launch into a series of reasons why this might be 
the case, I must first explain what I believe to be the objective that is 
most often being pursued by trade policy. For it is only in the context of 
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that objective that we can understand the fear that it will not be met. 
Trade theorists have been quite creative in conceiving various motives 
for trade intervention, often seeming to belie their avowed preference for 
free trade. We have met many of the motives in the discussion above, 
including the raising of revenues, the maximization of consumer and/or 
producer welfare, improvement of the terms of trade, acquisition of 
monopoly profits, and the offsetting of domestic distortions. None of 
these objectives, in my view, is what protectionism in modern 
industrialized economies is about. 
Instead, I see most restrictive trade actions as being defensive, 
attempting to undo harm, or prevent further harm, that is perceived as 
being done to domestic workers and firms. Certainly this is the explicit 
motivation for trade actions under various national escape clauses, and it 
also seems to be the motive behind many of the administered trade policies 
that occur outside the formal framework of the GATT. 
One could perhaps explain this desire to prevent harm in terms of the 
political process, though it is hard to see why agents would be more 
effective in lobbying for protection from a decline in income than they 
would be in lobbying for an increase: their stakes in the policy choice are 
the same either way. Therefore I suspect that the use of trade policy for 
such defensive purposes is better explained by what Corden (1974) has 
called a "conservative social welfare function," that is, a social-welfare 
function that attributes greater importance to individual losses in utility 
than to equal gains, thus embodying a bias in favor of the status w. 
However one models it, it seems clear to me that much of public policy 
is geared more to preventing harm than to fostering improvement. And trade 
policy is a prime example of that attempt, despite what one might say about 
the superiority of other policy tools for achieving the same end. I will 
therefore assume from here on that the objective of protectionism is the 
prevention or undoing of harm to firms and workers, rather than any more 
aggressive objective of raising welfare, profits, or wages from scratch. 
The choice between tariffs and NTBs will then be based on which policy is 
best able to achieve this objective. 
I turn therefore to a list of reasons why tariffs may be distrusted, 
in terms of their capacity to prevent domestic workers and firms from 
suffering income losses, bankruptcies, and unemployment. 
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A. GENERAL SUSPICION OF PRICE-ORIENTED POLICIES 
My first reason has nothing to do with rationality, but rather with a 
simple distrust of the price mechanism and a failure to understand it. We 
see in other areas of economic life a suspicion of price-oriented policies 
that may arise just from a failure to understand how effective price 
incentives can be. Economists' arguments, for example, in favor of taxing 
pollution are ridiculed as implying that pollution is acceptable so long as 
the (rich) polluters pay for the right to do it. The possibility that they 
will be discouraged from polluting by the tax, or will continue the 
activity only if the gains to them and society are larger than the tax, is 
easily lost on the public. In the same say, a tariff to protect employment 
in a domestic industry may be objected to. It seems to say that for 
foreigners to throw people out of work is all right, as long as they can 
afford to pay the price. 
Furthermore, I suspect that there is a bit of xenophobic paranoia that 
strengthens this suspicion. Foreign firms are seen as "out to get us," and 
it is therefore assumed that they will not let a little thing like a tariff 
interfere with undermining our livelihoods. A quota, on the other hand, 
appears to leave nothing to chance. ' It foils the invasion of our markets 
not just by making it harder, but by making it impossible. 
B. SUBSIDIES 
I turn now to the first of several reasons for distrusting tariffs 
that may be more soundly based. The first arises in industries where it is 
believed that foreign governments are subsidizing exports. If that is 
true, and if it is being done in order to increase exports themselves, then 
it is plausible that a tariff will just be met with a higher subsidy. If 
that were the case, and if the subsidy increase would match the tariff 
increase, then the fear that the tariff would not reduce imports at all 
would be well-founded. 
The question that then arises is whether this sort of behavior is 
likely on the part of the subsidizing government. Unfortunately, trade 
theory is not well-equipped to answer this, since we do not have a good 
idea of why export subsidies are used in the first place. Standard 
competitive trade theory implies that an export subsidy can only be welfare 
60f course even a quota is likely to have unintended side effects that undermine its 
effectiveness. See Baldwin (1982). 
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worsening for the subsidizing country, while recent contributions to 
noncompetitive trade theory cannot be said to have given us a general 
explanation that we can rely on as an alternative. 7 
Still, one can argue, without necessarily knowing the objective being 
sought by export subsidies or the means by which they are expected to 
attain it, that it must still be true that optimal use of the subsidy 
requires the usual weighing of costs and benefits. If the marginal benefit 
being sought declines with the level of exports, then it can indeed be 
shown under fairly weak assumptions that the optimal subsidy will increase 
in response to a tariff, but by less than its full amount. 8 
Thus, to the extent that exports are in fact subsidized, it is 
reasonable to expect that the trade-reducing effects of a tariff will be 
partly, though not wholly, undermined by an increase in the subsidy. If 
the tariff were being levied for the purpose of raising revenue, then this 
would not be a problem: the increased subsidy would actually raise the 
revenue that could be collected. But under my assumption that trade policy 
is being used defensively to reduce trade, a tariff's effectiveness in this 
situation is reduced. 
A quota, on the other hand, has no such problem. A quota pushes to 
infinity the marginal cost of raising exports beyond it, and certainly 
therefore will not lead to an increase in the subsidy. On the contrary, a 
quota may make the subsidy redundant and cause it to be reduced. If so, 
this would actually be a source of loss for the importing country, but 
7 
Brander and Spencer’s (1985) argument for an export subsidy is ingenious. but it relies 
on such a list of special assumptions, as shown by Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Dixit (1984). 
that it is hardly general. 
6 
Let a subsidy, s, be paid and a tariff, t, be collected on each unit of the quantity of 
exports, Q, and let the inverse supply and demand functions be p*(Q) and pd(Q), respectively, 
the latter being linear. Then equilibrium requires 
s = t + p*(Q) - pd(Q). (1) 
Let the cost of subsidizing exports be the cost of the subsidy itself less producer surplus, 
C = SO - Ips(Q)Q - j-zp’(q)dqi (2) 
and let the benefit be an unspecified function B(Q) with B’>O and B”c0. Margindl benefit and 
marginal cost can then be equated to derive the optimal Q. It is then straightforward to 
derive that 
dQ/dt < 0, 0 i ds/dt i 1. (3) 
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under my assumption about the objective of policy it would not be 
considered. 
C. DUMPING 
Another possible argument for the ineffectiveness of tariffs may be 
thought of as a private-sector analog to subsidies. Suppose that imports 
are being dumped on the domestic market by foreign firms. There are at 
least two definitions of dumping--selling at below domestic price and at 
below cost--and there exist a number of interesting theoretical 
explanations for the practice in both of these forms. 9 It would be 
interesting but too time-consuming to explore the effects of anti-dumping 
duties versus anti-dumping quotas in each of these models. 
A simpler approach is possible, however, that also encompasses the 
explanation for dumping that seems to be in the mind of the public, even 
though it tends to be dismissed by economists: predatory dumping. Here the 
concern is that dumping below cost is done with the objective of driving 
domestic firms out of the market, in hopes of later raising the price and 
earning monopoly rents. With this or any other reason for dumping, one can 
analyze it as analogous to government subsidies. The cost to the firm of 
selling below cost is the same as the cost to a government of inducing it 
to do so. Whatever the benefits that the firm may expect to derive from 
dumping, now or in the future, the argument made above about subsidies 
should apply. That is, a tariff will be partly, but not wholly, absorbed 
by the dumping firm, which will raise the price it charges in the domestic 
market by less than the tariff. 
Once again, the relative ineffectiveness of a tariff in this situation 
does not carry over to a quota, which should be effective in discouraging 
dumping for just about any reason. 
D, Low SHORT-RUN SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 
Subsidies and dumping lead to a distrust of tariffs because of a 
distrust of foreign governments and firms. That is not essential, 
however. Another valid reason for being suspicious of tariffs for 
restricting trade arises without any distorting behavior anywhere, from the 
very familiar property of supply curves that they are typically less 
gSee Davies and McGuiness (1982). Ethier (1982). and Brander and Krugman (1983). 
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elastic in the short run than in the long run. Fixed costs, costs of 
adjustment, and the like make it difficult to change output in the short 
run, even when the long-run supply response may be perfectly elastic. 
If this property were to hold for the supply to a country of an 
import, and if it were to hold in the extreme form of a zero short-run 
elasticity, then the suspicion of a tariff would be well-founded. Any-size 
tariff would simply be absorbed by the exporting firms, and imports would 
not drop at all. 
In this extreme form, however, the result does not seem likely. 
Exports to a country are not the same thing as production, and are not 
likely to be so inelastic. For even if a firm cannot change its output in 
the short run, it can presumably change to whom it sells. Furthermore, a 
zero elasticity is not plausible, even in production, for a great many 
products. Thus the idea that a tariff will be completely ineffective for 
this reason is not likely. 
On the other hand, a low elasticity in the short run is not unlikely, 
especially in the many products for which some investment must be made in 
catering to particular national markets, such as design of a product with 
individual national characteristics, marketing, and establishment of a 
distribution system. Any of these is enough to assure that a tariff will 
be less effective in restricting imports in the short run than in the long 
run. 
A quota, in contrast, does not have this property by definition. If 
we accept that trade policy is being used for the defensive purpose of 
preventing harm, the quota will be preferable to a tariff in that it will 
start to work much more quickly. 
It may be objected that these differences exist only because I am 
comparing a quota and a tariff that are both constant over time. Indeed, 
with sufficient information, if import supply has any positive elasticity 
at all, then a large enough initial tariff can be calculated that will 
replicate the effects of a quota by then declining over time. This is 
true, but surely if that is desirable, then a quota which has this effect 
automatically is easier to use and is not subject to the same errors of 
implementation. 
E. GROWTH OF COMPETITION OVER TIME 
Another natural reason for distrusting tariffs is, in a sense, the 
mirror image of the one just discussed. Suppose that the threat to 
domestic industry comes from a foreign industry that is expanding steadily 
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over time. Then the import supply curve will be drifting outward, and a 
constant tariff that is effective in the short run will nonetheless permit 
imports to expand in the long run. To prevent this, the tariff rate would 
have to increase with time, a result that can be achieved more directly 
with a quota. 
This is not an unlikely possibility. As the countries of the world 
develop at different rates, they move through different phases of 
comparative advantage. This leads to long-term swings in their abilities 
to compete internationally in particular goods, and these swings show up as 
growing capacities to produce and export these goods. 
The classic example is the textile industry. As a relatively labor- 
intensive industry, textiles in developed countries have met steadily 
increasing competition from various developing countries as the latter have 
begun the process of industrialization and as their relative populations 
have continued to expand. This threat has been dealt with by means of a 
system of quantitative restrictions, rather than tariffs, in part, I am 
sure, because of the knowledge that textile production in the developing 
world would continue to grow if not restricted in this way. 
Incidentally, tariffs and quotas have another interesting difference 
if it is decided in this situation to allow imports to grow, but less 
rapidly than they potentially could. To achieve this result with a tariff, 
the tariff would have to increase over time, seeming to become more 
restrictive. To achieve this same result with a quota, on the other hand, 
the quota would be allowed to grow, seeming to become more liberal. Thus a 
quota can be made to appear less onerous than a tariff, even when both have 
exactly the same real effects. 
F. DECREASING COSTS 
In the two cases just considered, while a constant tariff and a 
constant quota had quite different effects, it remained true that each 
policy could be replicated by a nonconstant version of the other. 
Furthermore an observant public might be expected to notice the price 
effects of a quota and therefore to infer the true level of protection it 
was providing. Thus it was really only a matter of convenience that led us 
to prefer a quota. In the final case I wish to consider, however, a quota 
really can accomplish something that a tariff cannot, and there is the 
added advantage, politically, that the observed price effect of the qumta 
considerably underestimates the protection it provides. 
Suppose, then, that the import supply curve is downward sloping over 
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the relevant range. This might be the case if there were economies of 
scale in the industry, especially ones external to firms but internal to 
the exporting countries, and if the importing country were the major market 
for the good. Or it might be the case, once again, if there were fixed 
costs associated with entering a country's market, such as setting up a 
distribution system. 
Suppose further that the domestic industry has constant marginal cost, 
at a level higher than the cost of imports would be if imports served the 
entire domestic market. To put us in a situation where trade policy might 
be used for defensive purposes, let this situation be a new one, perhaps 
because domestic costs have recently risen compared to those abroad, so 
that there initially exists a domestic industry to protect. 
The situation is shown in Figure 1. The domestic supply curve is the 
horizontal line, SS', and the domestic demand curve is CID'. Thus import 
demand is given by the kinked excess demand curve, SKIT'. The import supply 
curve is drawn as the downward sloping curve, SMo, and should be 
interpreted, for a competitive market, as a locus of points from a family 
of upward-sloping industry supply curves each associated with the level of 
the externality that arises for a given Q. It should not be read as giving 
the level of supply for each given price--which is not defined--but rather 
as giving the marginal cost associated with each quantity. 
Under these assumptions, the failure to protect the domestic industry 
will lead to its demise. If decreasing costs are internal to the importing 
firms, then even though costs for low levels of imports may be above those 
of domestic firms as shown in the figure, the foreign firms know that by 
expanding sufficiently they can bring those costs down, and they will do 
so. If decreasing costs are external to the importing firms, then there 
may be an equilibrium with no trade, but there will also be one at EF in 
which the domestic market is served entirely by imports. 
NOW a tariff in this situation is an all-or-nothing policy. Set 
higher than some threshold value, it will prevent trade entirely. Set 
lower than that value, it will reduce imports somewhat but not permit any 
domestic supply to survive. In the figure, a tariff shifts the import 
supply curve upward, to something like SM'. A tariff just large enough to 
cause this curve to pass through the kink at K is the threshold value above 
which there will be no trade. A tariff below this, such as the one shown, 







plausible assumptions is at r 10 E . At that point there is no domestic 
production. 
A quota, on the other hand, can be set to permit some imports and to 
permit a substantial portion of domestic supply to continue. This is shown 
for the quota, Qq. At the same time, the quota can keep the price of 
imports just equal to that of domestic goods, giving the appearance of a 
low tariff-equivalent rate of protection. In the figure, the tariff 
equivalent of the quota is the distance Tq. This is an outcome that cannot 
be replicated by a tariff except in an unstable equilibrium. 
This story is somewhat stylized, but it gives substance to the notion 
that competition can undercut a tariff, at least if it is of moderate size, 
and that such a tariff will therefore do not good. I have tried to frame 
it in competitive terms to keep it simple, but a similar story could be 
told, perhaps more believably, in some form of noncompetitive market. The 
basic point is simply that a quota can keep market penetration low enough 
to prevent full exploitation of decreasing costs, and that a tariff cannot 
do this without shutting off trade entirely. This makes the quota 
attractive as a defensive policy that need not greatly restrict trade. 
III m CONCLUSION 
I have looked here at two sets of reasons why governments may prefer 
to use quotas and other quantitative restrictions on trade. The first set 
came primarily from the literature on the nonequivalence of tariffs and 
quotas, either as direct explanations that have appeared in that 
literature, or as implications that can be derived from that literature. 
On the whole, while there are undoubtedly elements of truth in many of 
these, I did not find them convincing and complete as explanations of what 
happens in the world. 
I then looked at a second set of explanations, all of them related to 
the perception on the part of governments and their constituents that 
tariffs are not as effective as quotas in restricting trade, or, therefore, 
in preventing harm to domestic firms and workers. I found five distinct 
10 I am assuming a Marshallian dynamic adjustment process. A Walrasian adjustment process 
cannot be used in this situation, since the quantity supplied for a given price is not well- 
defined. 
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situations in which this perception would be valid. 
To me this means, first, that the preference for NTBs should be taken 
seriously as a reflection of a variety of valid concerns rather than 
dismissed as the result of fuzzy-headed thinking on the part of 
governments. 
Second, it means that our models of trade policy should be designed to 
make sense of the behavior that we observe in the world, including that of 
government policymakers. When governments consistently perform in ways 
that are inexplicable within our models, that may well mean that our models 
should be changed. As the ideas presented in the second half of the paper 
should suggest, it need not be at all difficult to do this. 
In another paper, Deardorff (1986), I have pursued these ideas more 
rigorously, attempting to formalize what Corden's conservative social- 
welfare function implies as the appropriate policy for dealing with market 
disruption. I recommend in that paper a policy for use in such situations 
that I think would be desirable to build formally into any safeguards code 
that might be negotiated. Since that policy recommendation has obvious 
relevance to the discussion here, I will conclude by describing it. 
My proposal is that safeguards actions should be implemented by means 
of explicitly temporary, globally marketable, externally allocated quotas. 
Specifically, once it has been decided that a domestic industry deserves 
some form of trade protection due to injury from imports, the GATT should 
prescribe that the importing country institute an import quota, set at a 
level no less than some base-year level of imports prior to the injury. 
This quota should be implemented by issuing import licenses in the amount 
of the quota and then allocating them to all exporting countries in the 
amounts of their base-year exports. 
An advantage of this policy, as I ,show in Deardorff (1986), is that it 
is capable of preserving the levels of welfare, both of consumers and 
producers in the importing country, and of foreigners--even those in 
countries whose exports have not increased but who would be hurt by certain 
other policies such as a tariff. Thus it directly acknowledges the reasons 
I have discussed in this paper for the preference of governments for NTDs 
and should not be subject to the current drawback of GATT rules--that 
governments are tempted to ignore or circumvent such rules. 
An additional advantage of this policy is that it automatically 
provides compensation to the country or countries whose exports are 
restricted by the safeguards action. Compensation has always been a 
requirement of the GATT safeguard clause, but compensation has been 
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difficult to achieve in practice since it was attempted through offsetting 
trade concessions. These were always of questionable value, and they did 
not, in any case, serve to compensate the private individuals who stood to 
lose from the action in the first place. 
A crucial feature of this proposal is that while these rights to 
import under a safeguards quota would be allocated to specific countries, 
they would be globally marketable and so would not require that the imports 
actually come from the countries to which they were allocated. Thus it 
would only be the allocation of the quotas, and the quota rents, that would 
be country specific. The quotas themselves would be global globally 
marketable. 
This feature would have the economic advantage of assuring that 
imports from all sources would be subject to a single-quota premium, and 
thus encourage imports from the least-cost source. In a changing world 
economy it would not freeze production patterns across exporting countries 
and would permit entry by new low-cost suppliers. It would also mean that 
the quota, in terms of its effect on prices, would be equivalent to an MFN 
tariff. As a practical advantage, the requirement that these quotas be 
global would eliminate the need for customs officers to monitor countries 
of origin. This would reduce the inefficiency, waste, and sometimes 
corruption that country-of-origin requirements engender, both in their 
enforcement and in their evasion. 
Finally, I have said that these quotas should be explicitly 
temporary. This is in response to an objection, raised forcefully in 
discussion by Michael Mussa, that by allocating rents to foreigners one 
loses one of the main political constituencies that could otherwise be 
counted on to press for the termination of the protection. To discourage 
this from happening I would require that these quotas be specified in 
advance as increasing in quantity by some preset percentage per year. This 
would assure that both the protection provided to domestic interests and 
the rents provided abroad would erode over time in a predictable fashion 
until the quotas became redundant. 
There is undoubtedly much more that needs to be considered before a 
policy like this can be accepted as desirable. I put it forth now to 
stimulate discussion. My hope is, however, that in discussing this issue 
we will not lose sight of the reasons I have mentioned in this paper for 
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